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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff-Appellant corporation
through its president to protect and preserve corporate assets.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Lower Court held that the president of the corporation
was not entitled to bring this action on behalf of the corporation
and dismissed the case without a hearing on the merits.
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RELIEF S.OUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of the lower Courts
judgment of dismissal and a remand of this matter to the
lower Court for ajudication on the merits.
~EMENT

OF FACTS

The Plaintiff-Appellant corporation is owned equally
by four sisters, one of whom is the Defendant Deloris P. Darius.
(R. 18).

Currently, the four sisters are deadlocked in groups

of two as to whether or not a corporate resolution authorizing
the Defendant Deloris P. Darius, Secretary of the Corporation,
and her husband, the Defendant Dale M. Darius, to purchase
property purchased jointly by the Plaintiff-Appellant corporation
and the Defendants should be passed.

(R. 63}.

Reconciliation of

the two groups of sisters on this matter did not, and does
not now, appear imminent. (R. 63}.

The title to the property,

though purchased jointly, continues to be held by the DefendantsRespondents in spite of the Plaintiff-Appellant corporation's
repeated request to have the Defendant-Respondents deliver
i t over.

(R. 63) •

In view of the deadlock between the four members of the
board of directors as to the sale of the property and the fact
that the title to the property is still ,in the possession
of the Defendants-Respondents, the president of the corporation,
Jean P. Hull instituted this action on behalf of the corporation
to presei:ve and protect its interest in the above-mentioned
propertyo

Defendants-Respondents responded to this suit by

-s-
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moving the lower Court to dismiss this action on grounds, inter
alia, that the president was not empowered to bring this suit
in behalf of the corporation.

The Court below, despite Utah

case law directly to the contrary, allowed the pefendantsRespondents' Motion to Dismiss holding that the president of
the corporation was not authorized to bring this action.

It

is from the lower Courts ruling and judgment on this Motion that
the Plaintiff-Appellant appeals.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE LOWER COURT'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW KAMAS SECURITIES CO.
VS. TAYLOR, 226 P.2d 111 (Utah 1950) RESULTS IN ERROR
AT LAW REQUIRING REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
ENTERED BELOW.

The holding of Kamas Securities Co. vs. Taylor,

226

P~2d

111 (Utah 1950) is applicable to the present case and controlling

on these facts.
In the Kamas s·ecurities

case the Plaintiff corporation,

through its president, sued its secretary for delivering to
unauthorized individuals collateral which the corporation held
on a note due it.

One of the grounds that the Defendant raised

to defend the claim was that the president was not capable of
bringing the action without a resolution from the Board of
Directors.

The Court rejected that argument.

It stated:

"It is true.that there was no resolution of the Board
of Directors directing such suit to be filed, but an
exe·cutive officer is not required to· wait for formal
resolution of the directors to perform his offical
duties to preserve the assets of the corporation or to
prevent" their disipation. 11 226 P. 2d at 115 {emphasis
added) •
-6-
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Thus, in a corporate setting where a loss of corporate assets
is at stake, i t is not only oroper for the president to take
legal action to preserve the assets, it is one of his "official
duties."

This is precisely what has occurred in Llovdona.

The pertinent minutes of the corporate meetings all show
that there is a clear dispute as to the sale arrangement of the
property which was jointly purchased by the Plaintiff-Appellant
and the Defendants-Respondents.

The October 17, 1978 minutes,

upon which Defendants-Respondents have relied to show that
a sale was consumated (R.35}, do state that a sale to the
Defendants-Respondents is contemplated.

They also state clearly

and explicitly that the sale is still contingent upon an agreement
as to the price.

The whole-of the minutes of that meeting that

pertain to the matter in question, as reproduced below, clearly
show this state of facts.
" The law office will be paid for in November 1978. The
original purchase price was $19,000.00. Lloydona paid
$2,500.00 down on i t as did Deloris and Dale. Deloris
also paid $500.00 for closing costs from her personal
money. The Darius• to buv Lloydona's Portion of the
law office.
Dale has arranged £or a current and independant appriasal through Miller Realty in Brigham and
Jean will arrange for an appriasal through Realtor in
Ogden. Monthly payment for the office has been $240.35.
The papers concerning the financial agreements be~Neen
Lloydona and the r:orius 's are in escrow until final payment.
Stockholders will receive a copy of the agreement when
the final payment has been made and the Darius's have
received the papers from escrow. The building was
purchased in December 1971. After the appraisals have
been comPleted Jean, Ga~ and Deloris will meet witn
Dale and decide on a Price. The will then contact
Jo and· confer with.
inal decision is made."
R. 3

-7-
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Th.e Def.endants-Responden ts also relied on the minutes
from the corporations annual meeting of January 30, 1979 to
claim there was a clear corporate resolution consummating the
sale.

(R. 35).

Again, a reading of the minutes, rather than

showing the acceptance of a corporate resolution, demonstrates
with clarity the deadlock pitting two sisters against two
sisters.

The whole of these minutes, with pertinent points

underlined, states:
" Office Building - Jean and Joy requested that the copies
of the original contract to purchase the office building be
clarified and given to members of Lloydona. A lengthy
discussion ensued. Th.ere was a lengthy discussion as
to the recent appraisals obtained for the building,
especially by Bruce Christensen. Gay proposed that unless
there is- a majority vote against, that we accept the
~14 ,oa·o ~ 0·9: offer ma~e bS 9a17 Dori us· to purchase Lloydona' s
interes·-c in the of·fi.·ce ui1ding. · It was· seconded b
Deloris. Two or, two a~inst. De oris clari ie that
it was not the intent of the parties involved in the
purchase of the building to sell the office building to
a third p!trty .--- .-· All ~ere in agreement to th.is.
Jean proposed that a clarification of the paper work
from escrow be made and Joy seconded this proposal. 'I'Wo
for, two abstension. Gay moved that the Christensen
appraisal be accepted as a valid appraisal and Deloris
seconded it. It was thereafter agreed that is was a
valid appraisal by all present." (R. 42} {emphasis added} •
As

the minutes state, two were "for" and two were ''against"

the proposal to sell the property.

The deadlock is clear.

Defendants-Respondents have also sought to rely upon the
last two sentences of the above q-Uote . .:.minutes stating that
there was a unanimous vote as to the validity of the appraisal,
to show that there was an agreement to sell on those terms.
The minutes speak for themselves.

The proposal was that

-aSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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" the Christensen appraisal be accepted as, a valid appraisal."
(R. 42).
~of

Thus, there was no agreement and approval as to the
the property, only to the validity of the appraisal.

The decision to sell, was deadlocked in sets of two.
Further evidence that there was a deadlock between the
groups of sisters comes from the corporate minutes of November
5, 1979.

(R. 63).

At that meeting the previously quoted

January 1979 minutes were amended and approved as amended.

The

amendments clearly reflect the split of two deadlocked groups
of sisters.
" Paragraph 5 - Office Building Jean stated that Gay's
Motion was not a fair Motion. Jov and Jean etated that
$14 ,000. 00 is not acceptable and they feel the transaction is not complete or settled.
Joy and Jean feel
that Lloydona should continue to pay on the office
expenses • ·Gay and Deloris agree that the $14, 000. 00
should' and has been accepted for the office bui.ldinq
and feel of the transaction has be-en and l.S· concluded.
Jean stated that she called all of us regarding the original
purchase of the office building and Gay does not recall
being contacted as she was in Peru at the time. No one
went through the steps of overseeing the original paper
work and signing the same on behalf of the corporation."
(R. 6 3) (emphasis added) •
Thus, the facts in the present case, as demonstrated by th.e
pertinent corporate minutes, are that two groups of sisters
are deadlocked as to whether corporate property should be
so.ld or retained.

The result of the deadlock h.as been the inability

of the corporation to act while the title to the corporation's
interest in the aforementioned property remains in the possession
of the Defendants-Respondents, a fact which these DefendantsRespondents neither dispute nor deny.

In the face of this

-9-
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corporate inability to act the corporate president has filed
this suit to compel the return of the corporation's one-half
interest in the aforementioned property and thus preserve
the corporation's assets.
what the

~scSecurities

Such a fact situation is precisely
case was intended to cover.

For

failure to follow this precedent, the lower CourtJs Judgment
of Dismissal should be reversed as a matter of law with a
remand for a decision on the merits.
II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THAT THE ARGUMENTS UPON WHICH
IT COULD HAVE RELIED FOR ITS JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WERE
INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY DEPARTURE FROM THE KAMAS SECURITIES
KOLDING.
The substance of the Ruling of the lower Court in granting

Defendants-Respondents' Motion to Dismiss states in toto:
Based on the Pleadings, Memoranda, and Affidav~ts on file
herein, I find that the control and management of the
Plaintiff corporation is in the directors, and they alone
may authorize the institution of litigation. That the
president thereof does not have the implied power or
the inherant power to institute this litigation in the
name of the Plaintiff corporation. (R. 84} •
As noted at the outset of the ruling the Court gave no independent

rationale as to why the president did not have the authority to
file this suit in the name of the corporation.

Rather, the Court

based its ruling "on the Pleadings, the Memoranda, and the
Affidavits on file herein.••
the

..

Defendants-~espondents

(R. 84) •

Thus, the arguments which

raise to distinguish Kamas Securities

take on additional importance; they become the rationale of the
court.
In the lower Court the Defendants-Respondents stated that
-10-
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"the Kamas case can be differentiated on its facts from the
Lloydona vs. Darius

case" and gave three reasons for the

differentiation: (1) the powers of the president in each case
differed,

(2)

the irreparable loss present in Lloydona differed

from that in Kamas· Se·curities, and

(3)

the nature of the

business in Kamas Securities was different and was controlling.
(R. 68}.

None of these arguments is sufficient to distinguish

the Kamas Securities from the case at hand.
THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT IN KAMAS SECURITIES AND THOSE IN THE PRESENT
CASE, WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY APPLYING DIFFERENT LAW.

·A.

The first reason the Defendants-Respondents cited for
distinguishing Kamas Securities was that in the Kamas Securities
case the president was

"t

clothed with management of every

department of the company.•"

(R. 68).

As

the Plaintiff-Appellant

pointed out in the lower Court (R. 73) , there was no finding
in the Kamas Securities case that the president of Kamas Securities
Co. was "clothed. • • with the management of evecy department."
226 P.2d at 115.
As.

stated in the Kamas Securities case, th.is quote comes

from the case of Greenbay Fish Co. vs. Jorgensen, 165 Wis.
548, 163 N.W. 142, 144.
upon in Kamas Securities

£2.:_ at 115.

It was apparently relied

to support the principle from 2

Fletcher Encylopedia of Corporations, Section 618, that "according
to the more modern authorities, the president of the corporation
has power to institute suits in its behalf."

226 P. 2d at

-11-
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115 quoting 2

Fletch.~r

eye. Corp. Section 618.

Contrary

to th.e Defendants-Respondents' assertion that the president
in the Kamas· Securities case was "clothed with the management
of every department," the Kamas Securities· decision relies
on no such fact.

Rather, the Court opinion in this aspect dwells

upon the fact that the status of the corporation and the
governing board was rather shaky.

("there was a controversy

among the directors'' Id. at 115.}

The focus in Kamas· Securities

was on the

~,

which was present for the president to

bring the action, not upon t.l-ie specific powers of the
president.

The Court's reasoning reflects this.

The Court in Kamas Securities

did not attempt to show

the president of Kamas Securities was "clothed. • • with the
management of every department" and then conclude that the
authority to instigate litigation was his.

The Kamas. Securities

court looked to the controversy in the corporation and determined
that it was in the corporation's best interest that the president
be allowed to file the suit.

Any attempt to distinguish

Kamas Securities. from the present action on grounds that the
powers granted to the president differed in each case would
appear to be very tenuous indeed.
THE IRREPARABLE LOSS SUFFERED IN KAMAS· SECURITIES
IS A UNIFYING, RATHER THEN A DISTINGUISHING POINT, BETWEEN
KAMAS SECURITIES AND THE CASE AT HAND.
B.

The second reason presented to the lower Court upon which
it could have relied to distinguish Kamas Securities was that
"in Kamas the corporation would have suffered 'irreparable loss'
in the Courts opinion if action would have been delayed."
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(R. 68).

The Defendanta-Respondents position h.ere apparently

comes from the statement in. Kamas se:curities that " the president
in this case was not required to obtain the consent of the.
Board of Directo.rs, and had he deferred action until such
consent had been procured th.e corporation might have

suffered

an irreparab.le loss." 226 P. 2d at 115 (emphasis addedl •
An examination of the reasoning and facts beh.i.nd thi.s position

in Kamas Securities demons.tra-tes

that th.e irrep:arabl.e loss·

in Kamas- Securities· was almost identical to that which the
Plaintiff-Appellant claims he.re •.
In Kamas, the Plaintiff corporation, thr.ough. ita president,
sued the secre.ta.ry for the. unauthorized deli.very of co.llataral
held on a note. of the. corporation.

Th.e collateral for the note

was de.livered by the Defendant to. h.is brothe..r., wh.o was liable
on the note prior to the running of the statute. of

l~tations.

Because of the running of th.e. statute. of limitations
on the note, the only means the Plaintiff corporation had
to collect on the note was th.e. colJ.aterial which i t had h.e.ld
in its possession.

-~·at

113.

De.livery of th.e. collateral

by the Defendant to his brother destroyed th.e righ.t which th.e
corporation h.ad to the collateral and thus their abi,li ty to
collect on the note.

.!.£··

Accordingly, the. Plai.ntiff COXJ?oration ·

sued the secretary to make the. corporati.on whole as to the. ·.
loss of the collateral for th.e. note.
As

the fore going facts. de:mons·trate, .the. aase.ts which the

corporation was trying to preserve in Kamas: s-ecuri--ties, the.
collateral for the loan, had already been lost. ·There would
be no ''i.rreparabl.e loss," in teJ:ms ·of regaining the. colla.te.ral·
-13....;
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which wo.uld result from waiting for a board meeting which
would authorize the president to sue.

The collateral was already

gone.
Likewise, irreparable loss would not be incurred by
waiting to sue the secretary of the corporation, as the Plaintiff
corporation eventually did.

The Court held that evidence

showing the Defendant not to be a de jure officer would not effect
the Plaintiffs right to recovery. Id. at 115.
Additionally, although there are certainly elements in
the Kamas Securities- showing that a dispute among members of
the board existed, there was no finding by the Court in Kamas.
that a deadlock, such as that which exists in the instant
case was present in Kamas, making it likely that the suit would
never be brought4and accordingly resulting in the loss of the
corporate asset.
In short, in Kamas Securities there was no pressing
need, which could be equated with "irreparable loss" ,
that the corporate assets would be inuninently endangered if
the action of the president was postponed until a subsequent
board meeting.

The holding of Court in Kamas Securities, as

to irreparable loss, therefore appears to refer to the
proposition that an "executive officer is not required to
wait for fonnal. resolution'' if such waiting "might have"
the result of the corporation losing its assets.

Id. at 115.

AS the record demonstrates and the foregoing arguments

-14-
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affirm, the Plaintiff-Appellant corporation is in precisely
this situation.

Due to the split of the four directors on

the board, there is no possibility of a majority vote to compel
the Darius's to deliver title to the property for which
Lloydona has paid.

Thus, if the pr~sident of the corporation

is not allowed to bring a suit at this time it is uncertain
what will occur to Lloydona's interest in the property.
Further, any argument that the loss is not irreparable
as it could be redressed by a derivative action suit was also
dealt with in Kamas Securities •

There, this Court specifically

stated that "regardless of any findings to the effect that the
suit was by a stockholder on behalf of the stockholders, this
action was properly in-d.tituted by the corporation at the instance
of the president."

~

at 115.

Thus, the second reason upon which the lower Court could
have relied for distinguishing the Kamas Securities case
from the one at hand provides very little substance for
departure from that precedent.
C.
KAMAS: SECURITIES CANNOT BE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE
PRESENT CASE ON THE BASIS OF THE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS
INVOLVEDo
The third possible reason offered for distinguishing
Kamas. is that the nature of the business in Kamas was idealy
suited to this type of presidental action.

(R. 68}.

Defendants-Respondents cite no aspect of the K'a:rnas s·ecurities
case which makes reference to this contention.

There is none.

To. conclude, Plainti.f £-Appellant's first argument shows
-.15-
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that the Kamas· Securities case is aligned with the instant
case on all major factual aspects.

This argument demonstrates

that the arguments of the Defendants-Respondents in the
lower Court, upon which the Court must have relied, fail to
distinguish Kamas Securities· from the action here.

Kamas

Securities is valid, undisturbed precedent from this
Court.

The Judgment from the Court below, is directly

contrary to that precedent and should be reversed.
III. THE AUTHORITIES UPON WHICH THE LOWER COURT COULD HAVE
RELIED PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR THE OVERRULING OF THE KAMAS
SECURITIES DECISION.

In the lower Court the Defendants-Respondents attempted
to establish that the law in Utah was other than that in the
Kamas Securities by citing th.ree sources: (1) general statutory
provisions from the-Utah Code, (2} encyclopedic references, and
(3} a case from the state of New York. (R. 13-16).

None

of these sources gives sufficient reason to overrule the Kamas·
Securities holding.
A.
THE GENERAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CODE
PERTAINING TO CORPORATE MANAGEMENT PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR
OVERRULING THE K.1\.MAS SECURITIES DECISION.

The Defendants-Respondents cited the Utah Code Annotated
Sections 16-10-33 and 16-10-45.

(R. 13,14}.

These provisions

state generally that the Board of Directors should manage
the corporation and that the corporate of£icers should obtain
their authority from the by-laws and resolutions of the board.
The Plaintiff-Appellant does not dispute these general statements
of corporate procedure nor does the Kamas Securities case argue
against them.

Kamas Securities· merely provides the rule for
-16-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

those unique fact situations where corporate assets are
imperiled and action by the president is necessary to
preserve them.

The statutes in no way give grounds to over-

turn this Court's prior holding in Kamas securi tie·s.
B.
THE ENCYCLOPEDIC REFERENCES PRESENTED TO THE COURT
BELOW PROVIDE AN INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR OVERTURNING
PRECEDENT FROM THIS COURT.

The Defendants-Respondents offered the lower Court
numerous quotations from encyclopedic references to present
its argument that the law in Utah. is different from the law
as stated by this Court in Kamas· Securities..

(R. 14-16}.

Each of these encyclopedic references falls within one of
three catagories which do not provide appropriate authority
for the lower Court to depart from this

Court~s

precedent.

First let it simply be stated that th.ere is a split in
the jurisidictions as to the power of the president to bring
an action in behalf of the corporation in situations such
as these.

2 Fletcher O:fc. Corp., Section 618.

The quotati.ons

rendered by the Defendants-Respondents in the Court below
reflect this.

For exampl.e, Defendants.-Respondents references

read "it has been

held" 19 Am. Jur. 2d Section 1157, "the

strict rule layed down by

~authorities"

19 Am. Jur. 2d

Section 1169, "there !!._ authority to the effect that'·'
Am.

Jur. 2d Section 1190.

19

(R. 15, 16) •

Plaintiff does not dispute the existence of contrary
authority in other jurisdications·.

It does dispute, however,

th.at they constitute sufficient grounds for the lower Court
t<)

overturn the rule of law set forth by this Court in Kamas.

Se cu.ri ties...

-17Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

To the extent that the encyclopedic references are not
based upon authorities from other jurisidictions where the
rule is different than that in Kamas· Securities, they reflect
(1) general statements of corporate law which the PlaintiffAppellant does not dispute (19 Am. Jur. 2d Section 1156,
19 Am. Jur. 2d Section 1119) or (2) specific statements of

situations which do not fit the facts at hand (''after· refusal
of a majority of the Board of Directors" 120 A.L.R. 2d Secti.on
120)

(there is a split on the board in Lloydona, not a refus·al

by majority.)

(R. 14,15}.

Thus, to the extent that the encyclopedic references reflect
the law of the jurisdictions and general corporate principles,
the Plaintiff-Appellant acknowledges their accuracy.

Inso-

far as the authorities have been relied upon by the lower Court
to depart from the specific holding of Utah case law, the
Plaintiff-Appellant contends that such reliance is unjustified
and error at law.
C.
THE NEW YORK CASE OF STERLING INDUS·TRIES· VS. BALL BEARING
PEN CORP., 298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E. 2d 790 (1949} IS AN INADEQUATE SOURCE FOR REVERSAL OF KAMAS SECURITIES CO. VS.
TAYLOR, 226 P.2d lll (Utah. 1950}.

The final authority presented to the lower Court was
Sterling Indus·tries vs.• Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N. Y. 483,
84 N.E. 2d 790 (1949).
overturn Kamas

Any reliance upon this authority to

S~rities

would be inadequate for a number

of reasons.
First, as mentioned above, authority does exist in other
jurisdictions for a rule different than that in Kamas Securities.
-18Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The New York case is one of those precedents.

However, the

mere existence of contrary authority should not result in
a departure from Utah case law.

No adequate policy reasons

have been given for this departure.
Second, the facts in the Sterling Industries are significantly
different from those in the case at hand. The Sterling Industries
case did present a situation similar to Lloydona in that there
were two sets of directors deadlocked as to what action to
take.

However, as the Plaintiff-Appellant pointed out in the

Court below, there were specific corporate by-laws in the Sterling

Industries case which covered the situation.
~erely

The New York Court

held that the by-laws were controlling and that an action

by the president would not be allowed.

there are no applicable by-laws.

In the instant action

Thus, on its facts, the

Sterlina Industries is easily distinguished from Lloydona.
Finally, it is interesting to note th.at by subsequent
case law t.11.e New York Court of Appeals has greatly restricted
its holding in Sterling Industries· and given the corporate
president the right to instigate litigation
to the one at hand.

Rothman

&

i~

situations similar

Schnieder, Inc. vs. Beckerman

141 N.E. 2d 610, 613 (N.Y. 1957)

("when directors deadlock

over corporate litigation and the president hires an attorney
to sue or defend for the corporation he may proceed and recover
compensation for his work.") (citations omitted); Westview
Hills, Inc. vs. Lizau Realty Corp., 160 N.E. 2d 622, 624
(N. Y. 195 9)

("absent the provisions in the by-laws or action

by the Board of Directors prohibiting the De£endant from
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defending and insti:tuting aui.t i.n the name of and in behalf
of the corporation, he must be deemed in the discharge of his
duties, to have presumptive authority to so act."}
Plaintiff-Appellant therefore contends that case law
from a New York Court, which has been restricted in its own
jurisdiction and whose facts present signi£icant differences from
the case at hand, should not be authority to overturn
applicable case law from this Court.
To conclude, none of the three authorities upon which
the lower Court could have relied provide sufficient grounds
to overturn this Courts prior holding in the Kamas S·ecuri ties
case.
IV. CASE LAW FROM OTHER JURISDICITIONS REINFORCES THE LAW
IN THIS JURISDICTION THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS THE AUTHORITY
TO SUE IN BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION.
As

stated earlier, the jurisdictions are split as to

whether the president of the corporation may instigate litigation
in situations such as these.
618.

2 Fletcher eye. Corp., Section

In Elblum Holding Company vs. Mint;,l A. 2d 204 (N.

J. 1938) the stock of a Plaintiff corporation was ••owned

equally by two families who (were) at cross purposes with
each other."

Th.is resulted in the "impossibility of securing

corporate sanction to bring this suit."

-Id.

at 205.

The

president of the corporation filed suit in behalf of the
corporation and the Defendants challenged his right to do so.
!,g,:_

These facts are almost identical to those presented in

the case at hand.
-20-
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Elblum Holding Co.

poi.nted out that there was authority

on both sides of the question presented.
the earlier precedent in New Jersey that

Yet it relied upon
11

a president of a

corporation may in pursuit of the power incidental to his
office take the steps in defense of litigation prosecuted
against his corporation in order to preserve the corporate
assets."

g.

at 206.

The Court further observed that "if

the president were to fail to exercise the power to protect
and defend the assets of his corporation, he might well be
liable to his corporation for the result of losses."

Id.

at 2 a 7.
Plaintiff-Appellant suggests that this authority further
strengthens the holding of Kamas Securities.

This courts holding

in Kamas· Securities is valid, undistrubed precedent which
implements the specific public policy of allowing a corporate

presid~

to take necessary steps to protect and preserve corporate assets.
This Court should maintain the precedent it established in
Kamas Securities and reverse the lower Court's Judgment not
allowing this action.

Other jurisdictions confirm that this

approach is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above the Judgment of the lower
court granting Defendants-Respondents' Motion to Dismiss should
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be reversed and this case remanded to the lower Court for
a decision on the merits.
DATED this ---------day of Dece'Itlber, 1981.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
ROMNEY, NELSON

&

CASSITY

DONN E .. CASSITY
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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